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August 6, 2003, ECB Control No.: 11/03/239
| Between: |
The
District Of North Vancouver
Claimant
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| And: |
2725312
Canada Inc.
Respondent
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| Before: |
Sharon
I. Walls, Vice Chair
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| Appearances: |
Barry
Williamson, Counsel for the Applicant
James D. Fraser, Counsel for the Respondent
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REASONS FOR DECISION
1. Introduction
[1] The applicant, the
District of North Vancouver, ("the District")
has brought a Notice of Motion pursuant to section 11
of the Expropriation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 125
("the Act"), for an Order that the Notice
of Request for Inquiry filed by the respondent owner,
2725312 Canada Inc., ("the Owner") on May
28, 2003 is frivolous, vexatious, or not made in good
faith or in the alternative is based solely on a claim
for compensation and that accordingly the request for
inquiry should be denied.
[2] Two affidavits were
filed which set out the background evidence. One of
these was from Irwin Torry, a planner who is Manager
of Community Planning for the District, and the other
was from Sandra Franke, Asset Manager for Penreal Capital
Management, a company that manages certain lands for
the Owner including the subject lands.
[3] The District is planning
a new Lynn Valley Library and Town Centre Project to
include a public library, a neighbourhood police office,
a public square, and an office, retail and restaurant
component ("the Project"). The development
of the Project is a central part of the Lynn Valley
Local Plan adopted by District Council on April 6, 1998.
[4] The subject lands are
located at 1239-1243 Ross Road in North Vancouver, British
Columbia. The legal description is:
PID 013-347-446
Lot 1, Block 57,
District Lot 2022,
Plan 2881
There is a two storey building that
used to be occupied by a meat market and a dry cleaning
business on the subject lands. This building is currently
vacant and boarded up.
[5] The Owner also owns
adjacent lands occupied by the Lynn Valley Shopping
Centre. Penreal Capital Management manages the shopping
centre for the Owner as well as the subject lands. The
shopping centre is currently listed for sale.
[6] The District was in
correspondence with agents for the Owner since December
2001 with respect to the Project and various factors
that might affect the shopping centre or the Project.
In August 2002 the District indicated that they might
want to purchase what I presume were the subject lands.
In the fall of 2002 there were meetings between the
District and Penreal Capital Management, on behalf of
the Owner, with respect to the purchase of the subject
lands and Penreal's concerns about the potential impacts
of the Project on the shopping centre. There was correspondence
between Sandra Franke, Asset Manager for Penreal Capital
Management and the District that set out these concerns.
The primary concern was the number of parking spots
that would be provided by the Project and the orientation
of the Project, including the location of entrances
and windows, so that use of the shopping centre parking
spots by visitors to the Project would be discouraged.
Penreal stated that these concerns had to be addressed
in order for them to recommend the District's purchase
of the subject lands to the Owner. There were other
issues about access to the shopping centre but these
appear to have resolved. The District refused to agree
to Penreal's specific requests about the parking spots
and aspects of the orientation and eventually the District
issued an Expropriation Notice dated April 29, 2003
in which it sets out its intention to expropriate the
subject lands. The stated work or purpose for which
the interest in the land is required is for the construction,
development and operation of a new town centre as described
above in paragraph 3. The Expropriation Notice was filed
in the Vancouver/New Westminster Land Title Office on
April 30, 2003.
[7] The Owner filed a Notice
of Request for Inquiry with the Expropriation Compensation
Board on May 28, 2003. The reasons for requesting the
inquiry are:
The Owner says that the Land is
not necessary for the
District's Project given
that they have indicated through their plans and discussions
with the Owner that they do not need the Land as part
of their Project.
On certain versions of the plan
for the Project provided to the Owner, no portion
of the proposed building [was] to be located on the
Land.
The Land is not required for parking
access or any other use for the Project.
The plans and correspondence relating
to the Project indicate that the District wants the
Land at best to justify a higher floor space ratio.
Given that the District is the owner of the balance
of the property on which the Project is to be built
and the District establishes the floor space ratio,
the District does not need the Land to justify a higher
density on the balance of the Project site.
2. Statutory Framework
[8] The statutory framework
for this application is as follows:
Request for inquiry
10 (1) In this section, "linear
development" includes a highway, a railway,
a hydro or other electric transmission or distribution
line, a pipeline or a sewer, water or drainage line
or main.
(2) An owner whose land is included
in an expropriation notice, other than an expropriation
notice in respect of an expropriation for the construction,
extension or alteration of a linear development, may
request an inquiry by serving the board with a notice
of request for an inquiry.
(3) A notice of request for an inquiry
must
(a) be in writing,
(b) contain the name and address
of the person making the request, his or her interest
in the land to be expropriated and his or her reasons
for requesting an inquiry, and
(c) be served on the board and
the expropriating authority within 30 days after
the date the expropriation notice is served under
section 6(1)(a).
Power to deny requests
11 (1) The board may order
that a request for an inquiry under section 10 be
denied if, on the application of the expropriating
authority and after granting both parties the opportunity
to be heard, the board considers that
(a) the request for an inquiry
is
(i) frivolous, vexatious or
not made in good faith, or
(ii) based solely on a claim
for compensation, or
(b) the person who requested the
inquiry has, at a previous hearing or otherwise,
already had substantially the same opportunity to
object to the expropriation that he or she would
have at an inquiry under this Act.
(2) If an order is made to deny
the request under subsection (1), the board must promptly
serve a copy of the order, together with the reasons
for making it, on the person who requested the inquiry
and on the expropriating authority.
Inquiry
14 (1) The inquiry officer
must hold a public hearing for the purpose of inquiring
into whether the proposed expropriation of the land
is necessary to achieve the objectives of the expropriating
authority with respect to the proposed project or
work, or whether those objectives could be better
achieved by
(a) an alternative site, or
(b) varying the amount of land
to be taken or the nature of the interest in the
land to be taken.
(2) The necessity for the project
or work for which the expropriation is sought must
not be considered at the inquiry.
(3) The inquiry officer may combine
2 or more inquiries that are related and conduct them
for all purposes as one inquiry.
(4) A participant in the inquiry
may
(a) be represented by counsel
or agent,
(b) present evidence and argument,
and
(c) examine and cross examine
witnesses and other participants in the inquiry.
Modification of expropriation
16 (1) Before the conclusion
of the inquiry, the expropriating authority may alter
the expropriation by adding or deleting land from
it.
(2) If the expropriation is altered,
the expropriating authority must file in the land
title office an amended expropriation notice in accordance
with section 6(4) and serve it on
(a) the inquiry officer,
(b) every participant in the inquiry,
(c) each owner of land added or
deleted by the amendment, and
(d) the approving authority.
(3) A person served under subsection(2)(c)
may become a participant in the inquiry, and the inquiry
officer may adjourn the inquiry for a period not exceeding
30 days from the time the person was served.
Report of inquiry officer
17 Subject to an adjournment
under section 16(3), unless the time is extended by
the chair or a member of the board, an inquiry officer
must, within 30 days after the first day of the inquiry,
submit to the approving authority and every participant
in the inquiry, a written report of the inquiry officer's
findings of fact and recommendations with respect
to the proposed expropriation.
Part 4 -- Expropriation
Decision of approving authority
18 (1) After considering
the report submitted under section 17, the approving
authority must approve, approve with modifications
or reject the expropriation, but an expropriation
must not be modified so as to affect land of a person
who was not a participant in the inquiry.
3. The District's Position
[9] The District says that
the Owner's concerns are set out in the correspondence
attached as exhibits to the affidavits. These concerns
are with respect to the impact of the Project on the
owner's other lands occupied by the shopping centre.
As indicated above, they focus primarily on aspects
of the Project that would discourage visitors to the
Project from using parking spots in the shopping centre.
Section 11 of the Act sets out the basis whereby the
board is to exercise its discretion in considering an
application that the request for an inquiry be denied.
Section 11 must be read with section 14 of the Act that
sets out the purpose of the inquiry as to whether the
proposed expropriation is necessary to achieve the objectives
of the expropriating authority with respect to the proposed
project or whether those objectives could be better
achieved by an alternative site or varying the amount
of land to be taken. The Owner in this case has never
exhibited any concern to date about the fact that the
subject lands were being taken. Nor has it exhibited
any concern that less of its land be taken. The Owner's
stated concerns about the number of parking stalls provided
by the Project and the orientation of the Project cannot
be addressed by the inquiry officer.
[10] The District says
that since the scope of the inquiry officer's authority
bears no relationship to the Owner's stated concerns,
the request for an inquiry is frivolous, vexatious or
not made in good faith and should be denied under section
11(1)(a)(i). Alternatively, the Owner's request for
an inquiry is based solely on compensation and should
be denied on that basis.
[11] In answer to the Owner's
submissions, the District says that case law about the
interpretation of frivolous and vexatious under Rule
19(24) of the Supreme Court Rules has no application
to the interpretation of section 11 of the Act.
4. Owner's Position
[12] The Owner says that
it never agreed to the District's acquisition of the
lands. The right to an inquiry does not crystallize
until the expropriation of the land. The District's
submission suggests that an owner needed to specifically
object to the acquisition of its lands while it was
engaging in negotiations as to the sale of its property
to the District. The Owner says that such a requirement
would be absurd and nothing in the Act or case law supports
such an interpretation.
[13] The Owner has complied
with the statutory provisions and filed a Notice of
Request for Inquiry that states the subject lands are
unnecessary to achieve the objectives of the District's
proposed Project.
[14] The Owner says that
under the Act it has a prima facie right to request
an inquiry. The Owner goes on to compare this right
to request an inquiry to the right to bring an action
in the Supreme Court. Under Rule 19(24) of the Supreme
Court Rules the pleadings of an action can be struck
out when they are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous
or vexatious. The test under section 11 to deny an inquiry,
should be like the test under Rule 19(24) to strike
pleadings: only where it is "plain and obvious"
and "absolutely beyond doubt" that the request
for an inquiry offends one or more of the criteria in
section 11 of the Act.
[15] In particular, the
Owner denies that its request for an inquiry was frivolous,
vexatious or not made in good faith. The cases interpreting
the word frivolous in Rule 19(24) have used it to describe
pleadings that are without substance, unsustainable,
groundless, fanciful, trifling with the court or wasting
time. See McLachlin and Taylor, British Columbia
Practice (2nd ed.). Characteristics of vexatious
pleadings have been said to include bringing an action:
a) to determine an issue that has
already been determined by a court;
b) where it is obvious that the
action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead
to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can
reasonably expect relief;
c) for an improper purpose including
harassment by multifarious proceedings for purposes
other than the assertion of legitimate rights;
d) in which grounds and issues have
been rolled forward into a subsequent action;
e) in persistently taking unsuccessful
appeals.
See Ebrahim v Ebrahim 2002
BCSC 466. Finally the Owner asserts that the request
for an inquiry was made in good faith and was not based
solely on compensation. The Owner submits that its request
for an inquiry cannot be characterized in any of these
ways.
[16] As a result the Owner
says that there is no merit in the District's application
and it should be denied.
5. Analysis and conclusion
[17] As the statutory framework
sets out, where an inquiry is held the inquiry officer
appointed by the board must hold a public hearing for
the purpose of inquiring into whether the proposed expropriation
of the land is necessary to achieve the objectives of
the expropriating authority with respect to the proposed
project. The inquiry officer has the alternative of
considering whether the objectives of the expropriating
authority could be better achieved by an alternative
site or by varying the amount of land to be taken or
the nature of the interest in the land to be taken.
After conducting the public hearing, the inquiry officer
must submit a written report of his or her findings
of fact and recommendations with respect to the proposed
expropriation to the approving authority and the participants
in the inquiry. Those recommendations are not binding
on the approving authority, which after considering
the report may approve, approve with modifications or
reject the proposed expropriation.
[18] In Walters v. Essex
County Board of Education (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d)
386 (Ont. H.C.) the purpose of an inquiry is set out
as follows at 392:
The chief purpose of the inquiry of course seems
to be to ensure that nothing has been overlooked and
that the approving authority before it makes its final
decision has placed before it all relevant information
which may be of assistance to them.
However, it is the approving authority
which has the final say as to whether the expropriation
will proceed. The court stated that even when the inquiry
officer had reported that the expropriation of certain
land for a secondary school was in his opinion "indefensible"
and "not fair or sound and should not be approved"
the approving authority could nonetheless decide to
expropriate. The Supreme Court of Canada, affirmed this
decision at (1973), 5 L.C.R. 144; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 693.
[19] This somewhat constrained
ability to object to an expropriation can not be invoked
by every owner. Where the expropriation is for a linear
development an owner in British Columbia has no right
to request an inquiry. The expropriating authority can
also apply for the request to be denied on the grounds
that it is frivolous, vexatious or not made in good
faith, or in the alternative based solely on a claim
for compensation. The request can also be denied where
the owner has already had an opportunity at a previous
hearing to object to the expropriation. In Re Calgary
Power Ltd and Henkel (1976), 10 L.C.R. 136 the Alberta
Court of Appeal in effect denied an inquiry when the
owner had already had an opportunity to raise substantially
similar objections to the expropriation in a previous
hearing. The Court reviewed the written reasons in the
earlier matter and determined that they were in large
part a response to the owner's objections to the expropriation.
[20] In this case the Owner
has filed its request and the District has applied for
an order that the request be denied under section 11(1)
because it is frivolous, vexatious or not made in good
faith, or in the alternative based solely on compensation.
The District says that the Owner's concerns about parking
as evidenced in the correspondence cannot be addressed
by the Inquiry Officer under section 14.
[21] I do not find it necessary
to resort to a comparison with Rule 19(24) in order
to consider how to interpret section 11 of the Act.
Frivolous is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary,
6th ed., as paltry, trifling, and futile. Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th ed., defines it as of little weight
or importance. Frivolous pleadings are characterized
as being clearly insufficient on their face and presumably
interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass
the opponent. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary
vexatious is defined as causing or tending to cause
vexation; not having sufficient grounds for action,
seeking only to annoy. Black's Law Dictionary defines
vexatious as without reasonable or probable cause or
excuse. A vexatious proceeding is characterized as one
where the party is not acting bona fide, and
merely wishes to annoy or embarrass his opponent, or
when it is not calculated to lead to any practical result.
[22] In this case, it is
true that the Owner has changed tack. While the Owner
exhibited certain concerns during negotiations prior
to the expropriation, now in its request for an inquiry
it is expressing different concerns as to whether the
expropriation is necessary. The difficulty with the
District's position is that the reasons set out in the
request for an inquiry fall squarely within the inquiry
officer's role as set out under section 14. The request
for an inquiry is neither clearly insufficient on its
face nor without reasonable cause. On this ground alone
I cannot find that the request is frivolous and vexatious.
Further, I am not able to say that there could be no
practical result from an inquiry even though the consequences
from any inquiry are limited.
[23] The District wants
the board to infer from the fact that the Owner has
set out new objections in the request for an inquiry
that the Owner is not bona fide and is bringing
the application to annoy or delay the District, or perhaps
to better its tactical position in negotiations with
the District. Even if I assume that these are the Owner's
motives, there must be more than a mere inference or
suspicion to establish that a request for an inquiry
is frivolous and vexatious. There must be other indicia
that the request for an inquiry has little basis, and
is being brought only to annoy or for some purpose other
than objecting to the expropriation as provided in section
14 of the Act. One such factor might be that the request
for an inquiry was deficient on its face and could not
succeed. Another might be that the claimant continued
to bring forward objections that had already been considered
in a previous application or hearing, even after a ruling
that was contrary. It would also include any conduct
that provided clearer evidence that the purpose for
the request for an inquiry was something other than
the inquiry officer determining whether the proposed
expropriation was necessary to achieve the objectives
of the expropriating authority.
[24] Finally, I am unable
to conclude that the request for the inquiry is based
solely on compensation.
[25] As a result, I must
deny the District's application. The Owner's Notice
of Request for Inquiry stands and an inquiry officer
will be appointed by the board.
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