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s.48/Tariff Cost decision
October 18, 2001, ECB Control No.: 48/95/212 

Between:415528 B.C. Ltd
Claimant
And:Greater Vancouver Sewerage and
Drainage District
Respondent
Before:Sharon I. Walls, Vice Chair
Appearances:L. John Alexander, Counsel For The Claimant
Robert J. Mcdonell, Counsel For The Respondent

 

REASONS FOR DECISION

1.  Introduction

[1] This is an application of the claimant under section 48(3) of the Expropriation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 125 (the Act) and Tariff of Costs Regulation, B.C. Reg 189/99 (the Tariff) for review of three accounts in this matter.

[2] The background to this claim is that at some point many years ago a pipeline was constructed and installed by the respondent across a portion of the claimant's land. In July 1994, the claimant and respondent entered into a section 3 agreement providing for a statutory right of way for the pre-existing pipeline in favour of the respondent. The respondent delivered the advance payment on August 16, 1994. The property has been subdivided into a 30 lot subdivision by the claimant.

[3] The original Form A was filed by the claimant on August 16, 1995. Counsel for the claimant at this time was Bruce Melville of Peterson Stark. The matter was first set down for a compensation hearing for August 11, 1997. The compensation hearing has been adjourned five times and at the time I heard this cost application was scheduled for the sixth time for what was now a 12 day hearing commencing on September 24, 2001. The fifth scheduled hearing date in September 2000 was adjourned in September 2000 because the claimant decided to appoint new counsel. John Alexander of Cox Taylor, present counsel for the claimant, filed a Notice of Change of Solicitor on February 1, 2001.

[4] Mr. Alexander presented the following Tariff accounts for payment:

Tariff accountDateTariff feesDisbursementsTotal *

i)Legal-Peterson StarkJul 11, 2000$24,570$1,619.33$29,742.48
ii)Legal-Peterson StarkAug 14, 2000-$ 259.22$ 277.36
iii)Appraisal-RackJul 11, 2000$18,000$19,260.00
iv)Appraisal-LepageAug 1, 2001$5,760$ 6,163.20
*GST and PST are included in i and ii. GST only is included in iii. PST only is included in iv.

[5] The respondent has previously paid $32,065.88 to the claimant: $26,715.88 for legal fees submitted by Peterson Stark between August 30, 1995 and May 20, 1999 and $5,350.00 for appraisal costs submitted by Mr. Rack on May 27, 1999.

 

2.  GST

[6] The claimant conceded that it was a GST registrant and therefore under section 5(5) of the Tariff no GST is payable on any account.

 

3.  Other experts

[7] There were also a number of accounts from other consultants. Certain of these were agreed to be disturbance damages rather than costs. The ones presented for costs are as follows:

Type of expertExpertDateInvoice (without GST)

v)AcousticalBKL ConsultantsNov 26, 1999$ 250*
vi)Land SurveyorCameronSept 28, 1999$ 25*
vii)Quantity surveyorCostexMar 2, 2001$ 468.75**
  Mar 2, 2001$ 881.25**
  Jul 4, 2001$2,535.80 net**
viii)Land planningGenesisJan 11, 2000$ 455*
  Feb 9, 2001$ 911*
  Apr 2001$ 205*
  Apr 2001$ 369*
ix)Engineer HunterLairdDec 31, 1996$3,675
  Mar 3, 2000$ 404.65
x)SurveyorPapoveAugust 2, 2000$1,153.75*
xi)GeotechnicalTerra EngineeringNov 17, 1999$1,040*
  Mar 10, 2000$ 540

[8] These experts had prepared reports with respect to the extra costs incurred by the claimant in developing the property as a result of the pipe. The respondent agreed to certain of these accounts that are marked with a single asterisk including BKL, Cameron, Genesis Development, Papove, and the first Terra Engineering account, provided that it is in fact for the report dated October 28, 1999 provided by Terra Engineering. These accounts are therefore allowed, subject to confirmation by the claimant as to the November 17, 1999 Terra Engineering account being for the October 28, 1999 report. These invoices total $4,408.75. As noted above no GST is payable.

[9] The respondent also conceded the Costex invoices which are marked with a double asterick. There were three of these attached to the schedule prepared by the claimant. The schedule appeared to double count a $500 advance but the actual invoices were as follows: March 2, 2001 for $468.75 plus GST, March 2, 2001 for $881.25 plus GST and July 4, 2001 for a net sum of $2,535.80 plus GST. The third invoice appears to be a final fixed price fee plus a further fee for additional services plus actual disbursements. This invoice credits the claimant with payment of the first two invoices that were advances or partial payment on the fixed fee. The total account including disbursements is thus $3,885.80. No GST is payable.

[10] The respondent submitted that other accounts lacked sufficient description to decide whether they were appropriate cost items. This included two accounts from Hunter Laird, (one of which the respondent had not received at the time of the hearing) and the second account for Terra Engineering. Having reviewed these accounts, I agree with this submission and defer the allowing of costs on these three invoices at this time pending better descriptions of the services rendered.

4.  Tariff Accounts

4.1 Preliminary Application

[11] There was a preliminary objection made by the Respondent that in the circumstances of this case it was difficult to proceed with a section 48 review when there were accounts from one law firm and an appraiser for substantial work done leading up to the fifth scheduled compensation hearing at which time the claimant changed law firms. There is also a Tariff appraisal account from a second appraiser who was retained through the second law firm. The respondent says that, at this stage, prior to the compensation hearing, it is difficult to determine which work of the first law firm and the first appraiser was reasonably necessary when the claimant chose to abandon this work.

[12] The claimant's response was twofold. First, the purpose of section 48 costs are to level the playing field by reimbursing the owner for costs that are necessarily incurred to assert its claim for compensation from time to time prior to the compensation hearing. Three of the Tariff accounts have been outstanding for over one year and the authority has not made any payment. Second, the accounts that were being presented at this time were for work that had not been abandoned. The same experts were being used except that there was a second appraiser, Mr. Wilts, with Royal Lepage. Mr. Wilts' work covered not only the reduction in value as a result of the taking (that had previously been done by Mr. Rack) but also an estimate of disturbance damages. According to the claimant, these two accounts were the only ones that contained any duplication. No legal accounts for new counsel were being presented at this time.

[13] Section 48(5) provides:

5) At a review under subsection (2) or (3), the person conducting the review must, after taking into account all relevant circumstances, assess the reasonableness of the bill and may make an order with respect to its payment, accordingly.

I note that this section is discretionary as to whether an order is to be made. I indicated that the cost hearing should continue and that I would bear the respondent's objection in mind in considering the various circumstances in this matter.

[14] This board has previously emphasized the importance of advance payment of costs under section 48 in providing a more level playing field that enables owners "to retain professional expertise comparable to that available to the expropriating authority". See Roadmaster Auto Centre Ltd. v. Burnaby (City) (1996), 58 L.C.R. 305 at 310. On the other hand, the respondent has submitted that in the circumstances of counsel (and likely the appraiser) being replaced so close to the fifth scheduled hearing date, the respondent should not have to pay those costs for work that became redundant and was in essence thrown away. Under section 45(3) such costs might be characterized as not being necessarily incurred to assert the claim for compensation. I note the comments of the former chair of this board, J.H. Heinrich, in Hruschak v Vernon (City) (1991), 46 L.C.R. 230 at 237:

In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, an expropriating authority should not have to pay for a second legal opinion. An owner is free to seek a second opinion but the cost will be borne by that owner and not by the expropriating authority."

In this case I was not provided with much evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the change in counsel in order to consider whether the work was reasonably necessary when it was incurred or whether there were explanations that might be characterized as providing extraordinary reasons. However, given that costs are now under the Tariff this lack of evidence is less of a problem.

[15] Under a cost regime it is the claimant who is entitled to the costs, not the lawyer or the appraiser who did the work. It is clear from a review of the legal tariff schedule that a claimant is entitled to only one overall Tariff account for legal costs no matter how many law firms it has retained. This means that for those items in the Tariff that overlap, with work done by more than one lawyer, I only have to decide how many units the claimant is entitled to for that item. I do not have to try and allocate the units between the different law firms.

[16] In this application I have only one Tariff legal account from Peterson Stark. However, in due course, a further Tariff account from the second law firm, Cox Taylor, will be submitted to the authority. It is true that it would be easier to wait until after the final compensation hearing in order to consider all the legal costs together, but this does not meet the purpose of providing advance payment of costs to the claimant. In Chan v Vancouver (City) unreported, January 22, 2001, E.C.B. # 72/00/197, the summary nature of section 48 reviews is underscored, together with the problems of applying the Tariff in this situation. Rather than trying to make detailed allocations as to which items claimed by Peterson Stark have been wasted, I will treat this Tariff account in a summary manner as including legal work that was necessary in preparing for the compensation hearing, even though it may be second counsel's work on a particular item that was in fact used by the claimant to ultimately assert its claim at the compensation hearing.

[17] I have also been provided with two separate Tariff accounts for appraisal costs by two different appraisers. Prior to the Tariff being introduced, this board has sometimes allowed as reasonable costs more than one appraisal account billed to the claimant where the claimant has established that at the time that each expert was retained it was a necessary and reasonable expense. When more than one appraisal account has been allowed, there has sometimes been a reduction of one or all of the accounts. See for example Bill's Frontier Restaurant Ltd v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways) (1996), 58 L.C.R. 204. The board has also sometimes refused the costs of more than one report where the claimant obtained successive and duplicative appraisals. See Hampton Investments Ltd. v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways) (1998), 64 L.C.R. 284 (B.C.E.C.B.). In the present case while the claimant tried to emphasize that Royal Lepage's report included extra analysis with respect to disturbance damages, at the heart of both appraisals was a determination of the reduction in market value of the remainder using the subdivision development approach. I have not been persuaded at this stage that retaining the two appraisers was necessary to the claimant to assert its claim. Moreover, under the Tariff, it appears that similarly to the Tariff for legal costs, the claimant is only entitled to one Tariff account for appraisal costs, regardless of how many appraisers it may have retained. In any event, in treating the Tariff accounts for appraisal costs in a summary manner, at this stage I am only prepared to allow one Tariff account for appraisers. I will treat the two Tariff accounts as a single Tariff account and review the evidence I have received for both accounts.

4.2 Appropriate Scale

[18] The Tariff accounts for the legal and appraisal costs for Peterson Stark and Mr. Rack are both presented at Scale 3. The Tariff account for the appraisal costs for Royal Lepage is presented at Scale 2 although the unit value listed is that for Scale 3. In his two affidavits for legal and appraisal costs respectively Mr. Melville states that this matter presented an unusual level of complexity because it was a partial taking and the taking of an easement rather than a fee simple taking. In addition, since the property was imminently ripe for development and was in the process of being developed when the section 3 agreement was signed, there were various disturbance damages, including loss of developer's profit, that would not have been incurred but for the taking. In its submissions, the claimant reiterated these reasons for supporting Scale 3. The respondent disputed Scale 3 and submitted that Scale 2 was appropriate for the purpose of advance costs.

[19] This board has previously canvassed the difficulty of deciding the appropriate scale on a section 48 cost claim where there is often relatively little information. See Chu v School District No. 36 (Surrey) (2001), 72 L.C.R. 89 (B.C.E.C.B.). Since this application was heard only two weeks before the compensation hearing was scheduled to be heard I have the advantage of having the appraisal reports filed by both Mr. Rack and Royal Lepage. The Royal Lepage report also includes several other expert reports on various disturbance damages. Having reviewed the pleadings and these two reports, in my opinion, the presumption found in section 4(3) of the Tariff in favour of Scale 2 for both legal and appraisal accounts has not been rebutted for the purpose of this section 48 cost review. This issue might be reconsidered following the compensation hearing if a section 45 review becomes necessary.

4.3 Tariff Accounts - Legal

[20] The Tariff account for legal costs from Peterson Stark dated July 11, 2000 is for the period from June 28, 1999 (when the Tariff came into force) until July 11, 2000. It claims units for 12 items, and as revised in Mr. Melville's Affidavit is as follows:

ItemDescriptionFixedMin.Max.Claimed
1Correspondence, conferences, instructions or meetings with a claimant and counsel relating to a claim, whether before or after commencement, for which provision is not made elsewhere in this tariff  12020
4Instructing expert witness if witness prepares a report, for each expert (maximum of 3 witnesses, without leave)
6 experts x 5
1530
5Every process for commencing and Prosecuting a claim before the board11010
6Process for obtaining discovery and inspection of documents11010
7Process for giving discovery and inspection of Documents11010
10Preparation for examination of a person coming under Item 11 for each day of attendance
(b) by party being examined 3 days
26
11Attendance on examination of a person for discovery, on affidavit, for each day
(b) by party being examined 3 days
515
12Preparation for application referred to in Item 13, for each day of hearing
Opposed 5 1/2 days x 1.5
37.5
13Interlocutory application for each day
If opposed 5 1/2 days x 2.5
512.5
16Preparation for attendance referred to in Item 17 for each day
4 1/2 days x 1.0
24
17Attendance at a pre-trial conference for each day
4 1/2 days x 1.5
36.0
21Process for setting down claim for hearing11
Total132

I was provided with Mr. Melville's accounts to his client for this period which lists the dates and activities performed for a total of 126 hours and $25,167 in fees and $1,878.55 in disbursements plus applicable taxes over the approximately one year period. The disbursements on the Tariff account were the same as in the accounts to the client at $1,878.55.

[21] Mr. Melville's Tariff account claims the maximum amount on each item where there is a range of units and also claims for both applications and case management discussions that occurred on the same day. This account is dated July 2000 and predates the board's decisions under the Tariff that set out some guidelines for claiming units under different items. See for example Chu v School District No. 36 (Surrey) (2001); Budd v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways) (2001), 72 L.C.R. 114; Topping v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways) (2000), 73 L.C.R. 72 and Ingham v Creston (Town) March 21, 2001 (unreported) ECB # 30/93/203.

[22] The first consideration is that considerable work was done by Peterson Stark before the Tariff came into effect and substantial payments have been made on invoices presented for this work. This work done pre-Tariff is not formally the subject of review on this advance cost application although it would have to be considered as part of a review of total costs if there is a final section 45 review after the compensation hearing. While the necessity for and reasonableness of pre-Tariff costs are not at issue in this application, this board has held that in deciding how many units it is reasonable to allow in a Tariff account there must be consideration of pre-Tariff work to avoid duplication of costs and as a measure of overall reasonableness. See Chu v School District #36 (Surrey).

[23] In this case I have few details about the work done on this matter between August 30, 1995 and May 20, 1999 that was billed in legal accounts submitted for payment by Peterson Stark in order to allocate it among items to be considered under the Tariff accounts presented. I do not know the total for the legal accounts, nor the breakdown on fees, disbursements and taxes. I do know that $26,715.88 has been paid on account of the legal accounts that were submitted prior to the Tariff, which likely represents very approximately at least 100 hours of legal work. The only other information I have is contained in the Affidavit of Dean O'Leary, a partner of Farris Vaughn Wills and Murphy, solicitors for the respondent, sworn on June 25, 1999 and filed with the board on the same date. This Affidavit sets out a partial chronology of events in the file including several dates when the respondent made Demands for Discovery of Documents, the dates when the respondent delivered a List of Documents and when the claimant delivered its third List of Documents, and the date when an Examination for Discovery of the representative of the claimant was held. All of these events obviously occurred before June 25, 1999 and do not fall under the Tariff.

[24] A second consideration raised by the respondent is that a considerable amount of the work of the first firm was unnecessary because of the history of delay on this file with multiple adjournments and unnecessary applications. The respondent says that it should not have to pay for this work that was in effect thrown away. When the compensation hearing was adjourned by the claimant a number of times over the course of this period, I am satisfied that there would inevitably be some duplication of work. Although I do not have much evidence on the circumstances surrounding several of these adjournments, it is likely that there was duplicative work for which the respondent is not responsible. This argument will be considered in more detail below with respect to a number of applications leading up to an application for the adjournment of the fourth scheduled hearing date in February 2000. I also note that under section 47 of the Act there is provision for interest penalties if the board decides that there has been an unreasonable delay in proceedings under this Act.

[25] I will deal first with some of those items on which work was done pre-Tariff including correspondence and conferences, prosecuting a claim, and discovery of documents. Section 4(6) of the Tariff states that when an item provides for a range of units, the reviewer must have regard to the principle that "one unit is for matter upon which little time should ordinarily have been spent" and "the mid-point of the range is for matters upon which an average amount of time should ordinarily have been spent" and "the maximum number of units is for matters upon which a great deal of time should ordinarily have been spent". I have reviewed the hours recorded by Mr. Melville during the relevant time, and considered the time that must have been spent pre-Tariff given the information in Mr. O'Leary's Affidavit. I note that neither the time spent pre-Tariff nor the advance payment of costs that have already been paid is to be directly offset against the amount claimed post-Tariff. See Chu v School District #36 (Surrey). Rather the time spent pre-Tariff is to be considered as one of the factors in determining the reasonableness of the units allowed in this review. At this stage I allow 8 units for item 1, 3 units for item 5, no units for item 6, and 2 units for item 7.

[26] With respect to item 4, instructing experts, I note that the Tariff only provides for instructing a maximum of three experts unless there is leave of the board. This issue was not specifically addressed and at this stage I am only going to consider this item with respect to three experts. It appears that one or other of the appraisers are the primary expert(s) with all the other experts being secondary. Mr. Rack was retained in 1997 and as noted below billed for 57 hours prior to the Tariff accounts. Some of this time was for discussions with and review of material from Peterson Stark. I have reviewed Mr. Melville's account to his client with respect to references to all of the experts since June 1999. I also note the other expert reports and the invoices they have submitted. Doing the best I can with the limited information at this stage and keeping in mind Mr. Melville's work with Mr. Rack pre-Tariff, on a scale of 1 to 5, I allow 3 units for instructions with respect to an appraiser. For instructing two other experts I allow 2 units. Thus, a total of 7 units are allowed for item 4.

[27] There are some items that occurred after June 1999 and did not include work pre-Tariff. These include items 12, 13, 16, and 17 for preparing for and attending interlocutory applications and pre-trial or case management conferences. As a result of the claimant having requested an adjournment of the third compensation hearing date scheduled for June 21, 1999, the respondent brought a Notice of Motion on June 30, 1999 asking the board to fix dates for the claimant to amend its pleadings and deliver expert reports. The board did direct that the claimant amend its pleadings, complete discoveries and file expert reports by specified dates. The claimant did not comply with all of these directions and there was another Notice of Motion and three case management or pre-trial conferences sought by the respondent attempting to get the claimant to comply with the directions of the board from June 1999. There was also one Notice of Motion brought by the claimant to amend its pleadings several months after the date specified by the board in June 1999 and less than two months before the fourth scheduled hearing date. Finally there was a Notice of Motion of the claimant seeking an adjournment of this fourth scheduled compensation hearing because the expert reports had not been provided. (I also note that claims have been made for two interlocutory hearings and two case management conferences on the same dates. These were heard in less than 2 1/2 hours and in the circumstances only one matter can be claimed.) While there may be various explanations for the delays in amending pleadings, holding discoveries, and providing expert reports, having reviewed the board file, I am not satisfied at this stage that the costs for these applications and the case management conferences were necessarily and reasonably incurred by the claimant to assert its claim for compensation or damages. I allow the costs for preparing and attending the June 30, 1999 application only at 4 units.

[28] Similarly with respect to item 21 setting this claim down for the fifth scheduled hearing date, when three of the adjournments were at the request of the claimant, I am not satisfied at this stage that this is a cost that was necessarily and reasonably incurred by the claimant to assert its claim for compensation or damages. No units are allowed.

[29] Finally with respect to item 10 and 11 for further examination of the representative of the claimant. As noted above the claimant had been examined prior to the Tariff account in February 1999. According to the affidavit evidence of the respondents in the board file there were outstanding questions and the representative was not responsive during the continuation of the discovery in September 1999. An application to the board was necessary to secure further dates for discovery. At this stage I allow costs for preparing and attending the examination on September 13, 1999 only for a total of 7 units.

[30] Thus the total units allowed at this stage with respect to the legal Tariff account is 31 units at scale 2 or $4,340. No GST is payable but the appropriate PST is payable on this amount. These costs are payable to the claimant for advance legal costs falling under the Tariff.

[31] With respect to disbursements I have no information on what costs may have been thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the fifth scheduled hearing date and change of counsel. As a result, I award $500 at this time pending further review at a section 45 hearing, if necessary. In order to assist counsel to settle these costs I note that I would allow any necessary photocopies at $.15 a page and faxes at $.20 a page.

4.4 Appraisal Tariff Accounts

[32] The Tariff account for Mr. Rack listed the following items:

ItemDescriptionFixedMin.Max.Claimed
1Correspondence, conferences, instructions or meetings with a claimant and counsel relating to a claim, whether before or after commencement, for which provision is not made elsewhere in this tariff12020
2Inspect and research subject property13030
3Market research, including all necessary attendances12020
4Inspection of comparable properties12020
5Analysis of data and preparation of a report or reports16060
Total 150

[33] I also have Mr. Rack's actual invoices to the claimant dated February 7, 2000, March 6, 2000, and August 15, 2000 in the total amount of $17,760 plus GST. Five hours of time on these invoices or $750 predated the Tariff coming into effect. The attached time sheets total 118 hours. In his Affidavit, Mr. Melville has allocated this time for the purpose of preparing the Real Estate Appraisal Tariff claim amongst the five items as follows: unit 1, 37 hours; unit 2, 6 hours; unit 3, 11 hours; unit 4, nil hours; unit 5, 60 hours. Despite allocating nil hours to unit 4, I note that Mr. Melville has claimed the maximum number of units.

[34] Attached to Dean O'Leary's Affidavit of June 25, 1999 was an invoice from Mr. Rack dated May 21, 1999 in the amount of $7,980 plus GST, together with Mr. Rack's time sheets for 1997, 1998 and the first five months of 1999. The time sheets indicate the dates, what was done and the time spent. The total hours listed on the time sheets comes to 57. The respondent has paid $5,000 (for approximately 35 hours) towards this account. The descriptions on the time sheets appear to include time for activities in each of the five items listed above although Mr. Rack did not finalize his report until after the Tariff came into effect. As indicated above the reasonableness of this earlier work is not under review in this application but it does have to be considered in deciding the appropriate units to be allowed in this application.

[35] The Tariff account for Royal Lepage listed the following items:

ItemDescriptionFixedMin.Max.Claimed
1Correspondence, conferences, instructions or meetings with a claimant and counsel relating to a claim, whether before or after commencement, for which provision is not made elsewhere in this tariff1205
2Inspect and research subject property13010
3Market research, including all necessary attendances12012
4Inspection of comparable properties1205
5Analysis of data and preparation of a report or reports16016
Total 48

[36] The back up documentation to this Tariff account, the actual Royal Lepage invoice to the claimant dated June 29, 2001, was for $5,000 plus (estimated) disbursements and GST. Neither the number of hours nor the hourly rate is indicated.

[37] Prior to the Tariff the board has considered actual appraisal accounts in a number of cases. While each case turns on its own facts, a review of the appraisal issue(s) and the number of hours and fees that were allowed on a final section 45 review, including attendance at a hearing, is of some assistance. See, for example, Ferancik v. Langley (Township) (1997), 62 L.C.R. 291 where the total fees (and number of hours) that was eventually allowed as actual appraisal costs was significantly less than what have been billed or claimed on behalf of Mr. Rack in this advance payment of costs application (that does not include the pre-Tariff work performed between 1997 and 1999, nor the costs of attending a hearing).

[38] However, the primary consideration at this stage is that, in a similar fashion as the Tariff legal account, approximately 35 hours of actual appraisal costs have already been paid for pre-Tariff work. This has some bearing on the total number of units that can now be claimed under the Tariff, although the reasonableness of this earlier work is not under review in this application. A second consideration is that Mr. Rack was retained over a total of four years, from 1997 to 2000. When the compensation hearing was adjourned by the claimant a number of times over the course of this period, similar to the Tariff accounts for legal work, it is likely that there was some duplicative work by Mr. Rack for which the respondent is not responsible. At this stage, after reviewing the affidavit evidence and having seen the two reports that were produced, I allow 5 units for item 1, 5 units for item 2, 9 units for item 3, and 18 units for item 5 for a total of 37 units at Scale 2 or $3,700. This payment is to the claimant for Tariff appraisal costs incurred up to August 1, 2001, but is not specifically allocated as between accounts rendered by the two appraisal experts retained.

[39] There was no claim for disbursements on either Tariff account.

[40] The Tariff account for Mr. Rack included GST. As indicated above as a result of sections 5(4) and (5) of the Tariff no GST is payable in this case. The revised copy of Mr. Rack's Tariff account that was attached to Mr. Melville's affidavit did not include PST. The Tariff account for Royal Lepage had appropriately omitted the GST but for some reason included PST which appraisers are not obliged to collect. I was provided with the Royal Lepage invoice to the claimant that did not include any PST. In these circumstances, section 5(1) of the Tariff provides that no PST can be charged on a Tariff account. Therefore no GST or PST is payable on the Tariff appraisal costs that are allowed.

[41] Finally, I would note that, although I appreciate the circumstances surrounding this application were unusual, it would have been preferable if counsel had agreed on whatever items they could ahead of time and clearly identified the remaining items that were in dispute at the commencement of the hearing.

 

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