| December 7, 1999, E.C.B. No. 60/95/178
(68 L.C.R. 225)
| Between: |
Donald Alan Richards and Maryann Delores Richards
Claimants |
| And: |
Corporation of the District Of Maple Ridge
Respondent | | Before: |
Fiona M. St. Clair
Vice Chair* | |
* Fiona M. St. Clair heard this matter in her capacity as Vice Chair but has completed
there reasons for decision since subsequently leaving the Board. |
| Appearances: |
J. Bruce Melville, Counsel for the Claimants
James H. Goulden, Counsel for
the Respondent | 1. THE
APPLICATION On May 21, 1998, I heard the application
of the claimants, Donald Alan Richards and Maryann Dolores Richards, for an order
fixing the amount of costs payable by the respondent, Corporation of the District
of Maple Ridge, pursuant to section 45 of the Expropriation Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c.125 ("the Act"). The Richards seek the
costs necessarily incurred by them for the purpose of asserting their claim for
compensation or damages under s. 45(3) of the Act. They also seek interest and
the costs of this hearing, but request that the determination of those costs be
addressed, if necessary, at a later time. Apart from this
final cost review itself, the costs claimed are in respect of the following seven
accounts rendered to the Richards by the law firm of Peterson Stark:
| December
6, 1994 | $2,010.52 |
| March 22, 1995 |
1,887.98 | |
November 6, 1995 | 1,209.13 |
| April 1, 1996 |
533.27 | |
May 13, 1996 | 1007.94 |
| February 1, 1998 |
$7,717.74 | |
April 6, 1998 | $2,269.14 |
| TOTAL: |
$16,635.72 | The
claims break down by category as follows:
| Legal fees |
$13,352.50 | |
Experts' fees | 533.33 |
| Disbursements |
617.99 | |
GST | 985.87 |
| PST |
934.69 | |
Interest | 211.34 |
| TOTAL: |
$16,635.72 | Of
this amount claimed, Maple Ridge has reimbursed the sum of $14,122.41, leaving
$2,513.31 remaining unpaid. 2. BACKGROUND
The Richards' claims in these proceedings arose from an expropriation by Maple
Ridge in November of 1994 of a small portion of land from their residence for
the purpose of a road expansion. Their Application for Determination of Compensation
sets out a claim for $28,000 for the market value of the land taken, $15,500 for
injurious affection to the remainder, and $20,000 disturbance damages, for a total
of $63,500 plus costs and interest. Maple Ridge maintained in its Reply that its
advance payment of $15,370 was adequate compensation for all of the items claimed.
It broke down the amount of its advance payment as follows: $12,000 for market
value, nothing for injurious affection, and $3,370 for disturbance damages.
The parties exchanged documents, and held examinations for discovery on January
12, 1998. The Richards obtained a report from a professional arborist regarding
the value of trees taken from their property as well as damage done to trees remaining
there. The Richards also retained the services of a professional appraiser, although
they did not have a formal appraisal report prepared on their behalf. I understand
from both counsel that at some point in their ongoing negotiations the parties
reached agreement on the market value of the land taken as being the $12,000 allocated
by Maple Ridge in its advance payment. No interlocutory applications were held,
nor were any advance cost reviews. A compensation hearing was set to begin on
February 1, 1998, but did not proceed as the parties reached a settlement on all
issues but costs the day before. Bruce Melville, counsel
for the Richards, advised me that the terms of the settlement are subject to a
confidentiality agreement with Maple Ridge, and he therefore did not adduce any
evidence regarding those terms. In the course of the final cost hearing, however,
Mr. Melville did acknowledge that the Richards accepted the bare land value of
$12,000 in the advance payment, and that they did retain an appraiser and seek
advice from him in order to get to that point of agreement. I was not provided
with evidence of any other terms of the settlement. 3. AREAS
OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES Mr. Melville advised
me that the parties have reached agreement on a number of issues, as follows:
- Maple Ridge will reimburse for photocopies at the rate of $0.15 per page;
- Maple
Ridge will reimburse for fax transmissions at the rate of $0.50 per page;
- Maple
Ridge will reimburse for all other disbursements as billed, including the experts'
fees of $533.33;
- Maple Ridge accepts the hourly rate charged for
Elizabeth Olkovick, the legal assistant, but disputes the time charged for her
services.
I note that the combined fax and photocopy
reduction amounts to $131.65. In addition, Mr. Melville
advised that the Richards were voluntarily withdrawing their claim for 6 hours
of Ms. Olkovick's time, in accordance with my earlier decision in Ferancik
v. Langley (Township)(1996), 60 L.C.R. 144. This time represents Mr. Melville's
conclusion as to what proportion of Ms. Olkovick's time was spent making cost
claims and handling advance payments. The Richards continue to seek reimbursement
for 16.1 hours of Ms. Olkovick's time, billed at the average rate of $67.38, for
a value of approximately $1,085. The reduction amounts to $404.28.
Adding together these conceded reductions, the sum of $535.93 must be deducted
from the overall amount claimed of $16,635.72. This leaves a claim of $16,099.79.
When one subtracts from this revised amount the $14,122.41 already paid by Maple
Ridge, the remaining unpaid amount becomes $1,977.38. 4. THE
ISSUES I therefore must determine whether the 7 legal
accounts billed by Peterson Stark between December 6, 1994 and April 6, 1998,
totalling $16,099.79 after the above-noted agreed upon deductions, were necessary
and reasonable, or if not, the appropriate amount that Maple Ridge should be required
to reimburse on their account. In order to make this determination
I must consider the following issues: - Whether
Mr. Melville's hourly rate is reasonable or excessive;
- Whether
any more of Ms. Olkovick's time is secretarial in nature and therefore not subject
to reimbursement by Maple Ridge;
- The global reasonableness of
the legal fees;
- Whether Maple Ridge should be ordered to pay interest
on the unpaid accounts, and if so at what rate; and
- Whether the
Richards are entitled to an order for their costs of this cost application.
5. THE
PARTIES' POSITIONS Mr. Melville maintained that all
of the costs presented were both necessarily incurred and reasonable in all respects,
and that I therefore should award the claimants full reimbursement for all of
the costs sought. James Goulden, counsel for Maple Ridge,
argued that the legal fees sought are excessive for the work performed. He submitted
that $10,000 in legal fees would be appropriate, which would represent approximately
50 hours of time at an hourly rate of $200. He compared this case with the cost
decision handed down in McKinnon v. School District No. 36 (1997), 61
L.C.R. 9. In that matter there had been a five day compensation hearing with
appraisal evidence, and the chair in his cost review determined that $22,000 (before
adjustments) was appropriate for legal fees. Maple Ridge therefore seeks reimbursement
of moneys already paid by way of advance cost payments in the present matter.
6. JURISDICTION
AND STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS As vice chair of the board
when I heard this application, I was and am exercising the powers and jurisdiction
of the chair under s.26(6) of the Act in making this cost determination. I have
since resigned from the board, but pursuant to section 53(7) of the Act, I am
entitled to "give judgment in a hearing in respect of which [I] was, while
holding office, sitting as a member...and the judgment is valid and effective
as though [I] still held office." The chair's jurisdiction
to determine costs following a settlement like this stems from s.45(8) of the
Act, "where an expropriating authority and a person [whose interest or estate
in land is expropriated] agree on the amount of compensation or damages, but do
not agree on the amount of costs to be paid." Pursuant to s.45(3), these
costs must be "necessarily incurred...for the purpose of asserting [the]
claim for compensation or damages ." Pursuant to s. 45(7), the costs payable
are the claimant's "actual reasonable legal, appraisal and other costs." The
board has set out relevant considerations arising from the common law that apply
to final cost determinations. These, as summarized by Robert Shorthouse, the chair
of the board, in Garnett v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and
Highways) (1997), 62 L.C.R. 32: ...include
not only the amount and character of the services rendered, and the labour, time
and trouble involved, but also the character of the litigation in which the services
were rendered, the amount of money or value of the property to be affected, the
professional skill and experience called for, and the character and standing of
counsel in their profession...[p.38]. Beyond
this, s. 45(10) of the Act sets outs considerations that "must be taken into
account" in a determination of costs under s. 45(8). It provides as
follows: | (10) | In
a determination of costs under subsection (8) or (9), the following considerations
must be taken into account: | |
(a) | the number and complexity
of the issues; | |
(b) | the degree of
success, taking into account | | | (i) |
the determination of the issues, and | |
| |
(ii) | the difference between the amount awarded and the
advance payment under section 20 (1) and (12) or otherwise; |
|
(c) | the manner in which
the case was prepared and conducted. |
I am therefore directed by the legislation to consider the factors set out in
s.45(10)(a) through (c) in reviewing this cost claim. The fact that the parties
have imposed conditions of confidentiality on their settlement, which preclude
disclosing the details of the settlement even to the board for purposes of a final
cost hearing, seriously impairs and compromises my ability to properly weigh these
factors. I considered, in reviewing the evidence before
me and the provisions of s.45(10) that I might have to decline to make a determination
in this case. However, upon reflection I concluded that it would be more in the
spirit of the Act as a whole to attempt to do what I could to assess the reasonableness
of the accounts presented within the limits imposed upon me by both parties.
6.1 The Number and Complexity of the Issues
The first factor under s.45(10) is "the number and complexity of the issues".
I can assess this case's issues to some extent based on the pleadings and the
submissions of counsel. Mr. Melville characterized this
as a case with a significant number of issues, which he summarized as follows:
- market value of the land
- value of the trees removed
- improvement
value
- damage to the trees on the remainder
- impact
of the loss of most of the driveway on the remainder
- damage caused
by the resulting non-conformity of the improvements on the remainder
- damage
to the house and garage
- removal of trees on the remainder and
replacement of lawn
- installation of privacy hedge
Mr.
Melville maintained that this case was more complex because it was only a partial
taking. He also argued that the issues regarding the trees were very complex,
because the law is not well settled with regard to trees as landscaping on residential
property. An independent arborist was retained, and a report produced to Maple
Ridge. Mr. Goulden maintained that this was not a complex
case, because there was not extensive documentation produced, there was only one
examination for discovery lasting less than two hours, there were no complex issues,
and no hearing took place. I am more inclined to Mr.
Goulden's view of the case. While it may be true that there are a number of issues
relating to the trees, I view these issues as being sufficiently interrelated
that they should not be viewed as amounting to a large number of separate issues.
In addition, while they may be relatively unusual, I do not consider them to be
particularly complex. I note as well that there does not appear to have been extensive
documentation involved in this case, there was only one very short examination
for discovery, and of course, there was no hearing. I would therefore view this
case as one of merely average complexity.
6.2 The Degree of Success
Both counsel maintained that I could not take this factor into consideration because
I have no evidence relating to it. Even without a confidentiality agreement, with
certain types of settlements it can be hard to ascertain how the issues have been
determined as between the parties, and the significance of the difference between
the amount of the settlement and the amount of the advance payments. With a confidentiality
agreement the task does appear to become impossible.
I am unable to consider the determination of the issues, because I do not know
how they were determined, other than knowing that the market value assigned by
Maple Ridge was ultimately accepted by the Richards. I have no information regarding
the claims for injurious affection and disturbance damages.
I am similarly at a loss to draw any conclusions from the difference between the
settlement amount and the advance payments, as I do not know what the final settlement
figures were. I must therefore agree with counsel that
it is impossible for me to consider the factors set out in s.45(10)(b).
6.3 The Manner in which the Case was Prepared and
Conducted Mr. Melville argues that
I also cannot consider this factor, set out in s.45(10)(c), because it is only
possible to consider the manner in which the case was prepared and conducted where
there has been a decision of the board. I disagree with this submission, and have
in fact applied this factor previously in cases where there was only a settlement
and no board decision. (See, for example, Hruschak v. The Corporation of the
City of Vernon, unreported, E.C.B. No. 56/90/175, October 22, 1999).
Having said this, the only real evidence I have before me of the manner in which
the case was prepared and conducted is contained in the account entries themselves.
I intend to deal with this factor in my review of the legal fees later in these
reasons. 6.4 Conclusions about Statutory
Considerations Summarized In summary,
my conclusions regarding the various applicable statutory considerations set out
in s.45(10) are as follows: - Degree of complexity: average
- Degree
of success: unknown
- Manner in which the case was prepared and
conducted: to be dealt with in review of legal fees
I
conclude that no adjustment to the fees as billed is required as a result of my
consideration of either of the first two factors. 7. LEGAL
ACCOUNTS I have attempted to reconstruct the accounts
extracting the 6 hours of legal assistant's fees that Mr. Melville has conceded.
Since he calculated the deduction on an average hourly billing rate, I have had
to review the accounts and estimate approximately where to assign proportions
of the amount of the deduction. After having done this, the hours billed and amounts
claimed for legal fees on the various accounts become as follows:
| Date of
account | Total hours
billed | Total fees
billed | | December 6, 1994
| 7.45 |
$1,436.00 | |
March 22, 1995 | 8.20
| 1,361.00 |
| November 6, 1995 |
5.10 |
936.50 | | April 1, 1996
| 2.20 |
272.50 | |
May 13, 1996 | 2.75
| 591.25 |
| February 1, 1998 |
35.20 |
6,398.25 | | April 6, 1998
| 10.95 |
1,952.72 | |
TOTALS: |
71.85 |
$12,948.22 | 7.1 Lawyer's
Hourly Rates Mr. Melville was the
only lawyer involved in the conduct of this case. His time (55.75 hours total)
was billed at the hourly rate of $200 up to and including part of the April 1,
1996 account, $215 for the remainder of the April 1, 1996 account and the
May 13, 1996 account, and $220 for the final two 1998 accounts. His total
fee billing is $11,863.50. Using a straight mathematical calculation, the average
hourly rate charged over the entire course of representing the Richards amounts
to $212.79. In support of the hourly rates charged in
these accounts, Mr. Melville has presented the relevant portions of various Vancouver
Association of Legal Administrators/BC Branch, Canadian Bar Association (VALA/CBA)
surveys on standard charge-out rates. He has directed my attention to the entries
for the average fees charged in a litigation practice within a firm of between
6 and 15 lawyers like Peterson Stark, by lawyers with a 1981 call date such as
his own. The data in these surveys deals with the period from January to October
of each year. In each of the first three years, the sample group consisted of
5 lawyers, and in 1997 it consisted of 6. The ranges and average rates in these
categories, for the years covered by the accounts under review are:
|
Year | Average |
Range | |
1994 | $190.00 |
$165 - 225 | |
1995 | $212.00 |
$185 - 250 | |
1996 | $198.00 |
$185 - 250 | |
1997 | $215.00 |
$185 - 275 |
Mr. Melville's hourly rate in these accounts can be summarized like this:
| Year |
Rate | |
1994 | $200.00 | |
1995 | $200.00 |
| 1996 |
$200.00/$215.00 | | 1997 |
$220.00 | I
note that Mr. Melville's rate was higher than the VALA/CBA reported average in
1994, 1996 and 1997. Only in 1995 was it lower than the reported average. In all
years it has been within the reported range. Mr. Melville
has produced an "hourly rate analysis" sheet, which he prepared on the
basis of a linear regression analysis. He states that it averages out the annual
data, and shows a projection for 1998 based on the historical data for the period
from 1987 to 1997. The graph contrasts this straight-line progression with both
the unadjusted rates reported and with Mr. Melville's own billing rates. According
to this graph, his billing rate was above the adjusted VALA/CBA rates in 1994
and 1996, the same as VALA/CBA in 1995, and slightly below it in 1997 and projected
1998. He maintains that a narrow practice such as his,
which is focused mainly on expropriation law, generally attracts higher rates,
whereas his time has been billed at rates which are very close to the VALA/CBA
rates. In addition, he points out that the bulk of the billings were in 1998,
when his hourly rate fell below the projected VALA/CBA rate. On this basis, the
Richards claim that the billed rates are reasonable for the purpose of this review.
Mr. Goulden, on behalf of Maple Ridge, argued that Mr.
Melville's rates are excessive and that they should be reduced. He maintained
that for the 1994, 1995 and 1996 accounts the appropriate rate is what the board
was routinely awarding at the time, which he suggested was $185 per hour. He suggested
that a rate of $200 should be applied to the last two accounts, because the VALA/CBA
survey does not deal specifically with the expropriation bar, and therefore is
of limited relevance. With regard to the VALA/CBA surveys
in general, Mr. Goulden argued that they were of limited use. They contain no
indication of their margin of error, there is a very limited number of lawyers
forming part of the samples referred to, and there is an extremely wide range
of rates charged even within those small samples. Finally, he pointed out that
there was no evidence before me that a more specialized practice justifies higher
hourly rates. The VALA/CBA surveys have been considered
in a number of cases put before the board. In Buchanan v. School District
No. 36 (Surrey) (1997), 61 L.C.R. 288, the chair of the board, Robert Shorthouse,
came to the following conclusion at p.299 of his reasons: I
view this evidence as a useful indicator of the hourly rates which lawyers seek
to charge but not a determinative indicator of what they effectively receive. Mr.
Shorthouse considered the evidence contained in VALA/CBA surveys once again in
Garnett. At pages 48 and 49 of his reasons, he stated:
...I conclude that this evidence, useful as it may be, cannot
be accepted at face value as a determinative indicator of the market rates effectively
received by lawyers. First, as counsel for the Ministry points out, the information
contained in the surveys is clearly hearsay and its reliability as such is weakened
somewhat by a lack of evidence concerning how the survey was conducted and what
the respondents intended in answering as they did. Second, the sample size (that
is, the number of respondents) is very small and, in that way, the result is subject
to statistical distortion. Third, there has been evidence before the board in
other cost reviews showing that the hourly rates paid to ad hoc counsel by the
Crown Provincial in expropriation and assessment matters are significantly lower
than those disclosed in the survey... I agree
with the conclusions drawn by the chair in these decisions, and with the concerns
put forward in this review by Maple Ridge. I therefore find the VALA/CBA evidence
to be of some utility and interest, but certainly not to be a determinative indicator
of the relevant market rates. I note, in addition, that there is no evidence before
me regarding 1998 rates other than Mr. Melville's projected figures, which, given
the small sampling they are based on, would be statistically quite unreliable.
I have also reviewed all of the board's decisions regarding hourly rates during
the relevant period of time covered by these accounts. Taking into account all
the evidence before me and the previous decisions of the board, I have decided
that the following hourly rates would be reasonable for Mr. Melville's time in
this matter: |
Year | Rate |
| 1994 | $180.00 |
| 1995 |
$190.00 | | 1996 |
$200.00 | |
1997 | $200.00 | |
1998 | $200.00 |
Using Mr. Melville's table, which breaks
down the legal fees by account and by hourly rate, and as between himself and
Ms. Olkovick, I conclude that adjusting the hourly rate in this way would bring
Mr. Melville's fees from the $11,863.50 charged down to $10,875.50.
7.2 Reasonableness of Fees
Maple Ridge maintains that much of Ms. Olkovick's time (still left after the voluntary
reductions referred to earlier in these reasons) is secretarial in nature and
should therefore be disallowed. In addition, it points out that an overly large
portion of the accounts (about 15%) is dedicated to the time after the settlement
was reached. I note, however, that Maple Ridge has not, beyond highlighting this
fact, indicated why it was not reasonable for Mr. Melville to have spent this
time on the file at that point. As I indicated earlier in these reasons, Maple
Ridge simply argues that $10,000 would be an appropriate award of costs in this
case. Mr. Melville argued that, while claimants are normally
required to demonstrate that the costs they have incurred are reasonable in a
global sense, the Richards cannot do this without breaching their confidentiality
agreement with Maple Ridge. He therefore submitted that a global reasonableness
test should not be applied in this case. I concede that
my ability to determine global reasonableness is impaired by the existence of
the confidentiality agreement and the therefore limited evidence and submissions
before me on this review. I nonetheless feel that I am obliged to look carefully
at all of the account entries, and to do my best to determine whether the time
billed appears reasonable in light of the claims that were being put forward in
the compensation proceedings. Turning first to Ms. Olkovick's
time, I am unable, on the face of the account entries, to find that any more of
her time should be disallowed on the basis of its representing secretarial duties
rather than the duties of a legal assistant. It appears to me that she was the
legal firm's primary contact with the expert arborist, and also that she spent
time assisting with documents and with hearing preparation. There are a number
of entries for telephone calls to Mr. Goulden and others, but these could quite
properly have been performed in the discharge of these legal assistant duties.
I therefore will allow the remainder of Ms. Olkovick's time as billed.
In terms of Maple Ridge's criticism of the seventh and final account, I calculate
that, after the adjustments for Ms. Olkovick's time and Mr. Melville's fees, the
claim amounts to $1,795.72. This is made up of 7.85 hours of Mr. Melville's time
at an hourly rate of $200 ($1,570), plus just over 3 hours of Ms. Olkovick's time
amounting to $225.72 in fees. This is just short of 11 hours out of an adjusted
total of 71.85 hours billed, which amounts to approximately 15.3% of the total
number of hours. While there might well be good reasons
for the settlement details to take this long to iron out, I have been provided
no evidence as to why this was the case here. Under these circumstances, I feel
compelled to reduce this time to a figure that would be more normal under most
circumstances with a case of average complexity. I therefore reduce the time allowed
on the final account of April 6, 1998 to 4.5 hours for Mr. Melville and 1.5 for
Ms. Olkovick. This, at the hourly rates of $200 and $75 respectively, brings the
fee total for this account to $1,012.50. I am unable,
based on the evidence before me, to find any other obvious areas of unreasonableness
with the fee accounts submitted. On the other hand, the claimants bear the onus
of proving the reasonableness of their accounts, a burden which in the circumstances
of the confidentiality agreement they have been unable effectively to discharge.
I have concluded that the only sensible way to deal with this unsatisfactory situation
is to deduct a further amount from the accounts as billed to reflect this fact.
I deduct as reasonable the further sum of $1,000. In the result, I therefore calculate
the amounts allowed to be as follows:
| Date of account |
Fees allowed | |
December 6, 1994 |
$1,305.00 | |
March 22, 1995 | 1,273.50 |
| November 6, 1995 |
891.50 | |
April 1, 1996 | 260.00 |
| May 13, 1996 |
550.00 | |
February 1, 1998 | 5,893.50 |
| April 6, 1998 |
1,012.50 | |
Total: |
$11,186.00 | |
Less $1,000: |
$10,186.00 |
Since the fax and photocopy disbursements are not set out in the accounts on a
per item basis, I am unable to adjust the amounts due as agreed between the parties,
and I am also unable to adjust the GST and PST for the same reason. I will therefore
have to leave these calculations to the parties. 8. INTEREST
The terms of the retainer agreement between Peterson Stark and the Richards provide
for interest at the rate of 1.5% per month on accounts unpaid over 30 days. This
agreement is in evidence before me, and Mr. Melville has prepared a table showing
the history of the cost claims and payments in this matter.
The dates and amounts of the claims and payments are as follows:
| Date |
Claimed |
Paid | | Dec. 6/94 |
2,010.52 | |
| Jan. 20/95 |
|
$1,809.59 | | Mar. 22/95 |
1,887.98 | |
| May 15/95 |
|
$1,711.28 | | Nov. 6/95 |
$1,209.13 | |
| Nov. 27/95 |
|
$1,080.88 | | April 1/96 |
$533.27 | | |
May 13/96 | $1,007.94 | |
| July 11/96 |
|
$1,020.66 | | Feb. 1/98 |
$7,717.74 | | |
March 30/98 | |
$8,500.00 | |
April 6/98 | $2,269.14 | |
| Total: |
$16,635.72 |
$14,122.41 | As
I noted above, the difference between what was originally claimed and what was
paid only amounts to $2,513.31. While I am unable to calculate the final figure
for my cost award in this review, I am able to calculate that the fees awarded
differ from the fees originally claimed by $3,166.50, which is more than the difference
that the claimants maintained was owing at the start of the review.
This means that Maple Ridge has overpaid the Richards in terms of what they will
be entitled to under this award of costs. I note, in addition, that the payments
made in this case were reasonably prompt, having generally been made within the
time frame the board has previously determined to be reasonable. Under these circumstances,
I have concluded that the Richards have been adequately compensated for any loss
they may have suffered as a result of the rather short delays in receiving reimbursement
for their claims, by the fact and the amount of the overpayment. I therefore decline
to award interest on the costs allowed in this review. 9. COSTS
OF THIS REVIEW Mr. Melville has requested that the
matter of the costs of this review not be addressed at this time. He maintained
that if the costs could not be settled between the parties, he intended to call
additional evidence which he stated should not be put before me at this time.
He therefore sought leave to re-apply for a determination of costs if the parties
were unable to resolve the matter. Mr. Goulden maintained that Maple Ridge should
not be required to pay anything more than it already has towards the Richards'
costs. Since the Richards have been awarded less than
they were paid for their costs, and since I have awarded legal fees in almost
exactly the amount Maple Ridge represented should be found to be reasonable under
the circumstances, I find that the claimants have been unsuccessful in their claims
for reimbursement, and therefore should not be awarded their costs of this review.
|
